Interview by Josh Harlan
question got reformulated as, "Are thinking and referring identical with computational states of the brain?"
In my present view, these "identity" questions are misguided, although it took me many years to come to this conclusion (which I defend at length in Representation and Reality). I think the search for an "identity" between properties having to do with the description of thought and reference and physical, or at least computational, properties is driven by a fear -the fear that the only alternative is t o return t o dualism, t o the picture of a ghost in a machine. But that is not the only alternative. The right alternative -an alternative defended, in different ways, n o t only by myself b u t earlier by Wittgenstein, by Austin, by Strawson, by Donald Davidson (and, even, much earlier, in a peculiar way, by Wiliam James) -is to see the natural scientific description of the living human organism ( a description which systematically abstracts from purpose and meaning) and the "mentalistic" description in terms of purpose and meaning as complementary.
Neither is reducible to the other, but that does not mean that they are in any sense competitors. Of course, this involves rejecting the claim that the scientific description is the only "first class" description of reality, i.e., that it is the "perspective free" description of the whole of reality. And that claim has deep roots in the Western way of thinking since the 17th century. Thus the discussion in philosophy of mind today has become uncontainable -discussions in philosophy of mind become discussions in metaphysics, in epistemology, in metaphilosophy, etc.
Coming back t o the question as you posed it, the question of the "ultimate goals" of philosophy of mind, one might say that there are two competing answers today. The answer of traditional philosophy is that the goal is to answer the identity questions I listed, that is either t o tell us in materialistic terms exactly what is constitutive of thinking, referring, perceiving, etc. -in short, to squeeze the conceptual scheme of purpose and meaning inside the scientific scheme -or, failing that, t o establish that dualism is correct, that we have immaterial souls over and above our bodies and brains. The answer of the competing current I described, in which I include myself, is that the goal should be to render philosophy of mind, as traditionally conceived, obsolete.
The first current, in its reductionist form, does expect answers t o the problems of philososphy of mind (as it conceives them) to come from neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology). The second current thinks that these subjects give us information that constrains what we can say about human beings in the language of purpose and meaning, but that the project of reducing our mentalistic concepts to "scientific" ones is misguided. Putnam: My discussion of the "brain in a vat" model of Cartesian scepticism is too long to summarize here, but I can say what my purpose was: my purpose was to argue that concepts and world involve each other, that the concepts you have depend on the world you inhabit and how you are related to it. The idea that we first have concepts in some purely "private" medium and we must then proceed to see if anything corresponds to them has had a powerful grip on our thinking ever since Descartes, but it is at bottom completely incoherent. Or that, at least, is what I claim to show. Our notion of reality is necessarily subject to correction (that is part of what makes it a notion of reality ), but the thought that it could be an "illusion" has only the appearance of making sense.
HRP:

HRP: Please tell us about your recent book Realism With a Human Face (Harvard University Press 1990). How does it reflect a change in your earlier views?
Putnam: Realism with a Human Face does not reflect a change in my views as compared to, say, Reason, Truth and History written about ten years earlier, but it does reflect a development of them in several directions. For one thing, the sorts of criticisms I made of metaphysical realism in Reason, Truth and History are now being used by Rorty and others to defend relativism, and I regard relativism as a bogus alternative. So I have had to examine Rortian relativism in some detail. In addition, I have had to try to show that the philosophical view I proposed under the name "internal realism" really is a realism, that giving up the idea that there is just one true and complete description of reality, say the scientific description, does not mean abandoning the notion of an objective world to which our descriptions must conform.
Perhaps most important, I try to defend the idea that the theoretical and practical aspects of philosophy depend on each other. Dewey wrote (in Reconstruction in Philosophy) that "philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men"; I think that the problems of philosophers and the problems of men and women are connected, and that it is part of the task of a responsible philosophy to bring out the connection.
HRP: Can you illustrate the connection you are thinking of?
Putnam: Quite easily. Doubts as to whether normative judgements, and particularly ethical judgements, can be "objective" are almost universal nowadays, and clearly connected with the view that there is a fundamental dichotomy between "facts" and "values" -a view that is the product of the philosophy shop. I see the task of undermining this dichotomy as one of the central points at which one can address a real world malaise and a set of issues in theoretical philosophy at the same time.
HRP: What projects are you currently working on? Do you have any plans for the future?
Putnam: With my wife, Ruth Anna Putnam, I am currently working on a book on William James. This project grows naturally out of the orientation I have been describing. For example, James defends the idea that perceptual data and concepts are interdependent, that percepts cannot be thought of as "prior to" concepts (or vice versa) -an idea of obvious importance for the philosophy of mind -and the idea that all facts depend on values (and vice versa) -an idea of obvious relevance to my concern (and Ruth Anna's as well) with getting beyond the fact/value dichotomy. In recent years I have found the work of the classical American Pragmatists -Peirce, James and Dewey -full of insights in connection with all these problems. In the longer run, I hope to find more to say about the problem of "intentionality" -that is, the difficulty we feel in understanding the relation of thought to the world -which is behind both "the mind-body problem" and "the fact-value problem".
